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Introduction 
The ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) 
have played a proactive and sometimes influential role in regional debates on Asian 
economic integration and security cooperation. These think tanks and their directors 
sought to promote social learning and help create a sense of regional identity at an 
elite level amongst nascent regional policy communities. This contribution to regional 
cooperation was through a ‗repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation and 
internalization‘ (Johnstone 2005, p. 189) conducted via intensive networking and 
informal diplomacy. Think tanks have often provided the ‗neutral territory‘ outside 
the architecture of the state for the conduct of informal diplomacy. Such networking 
entails unofficial activities involving academics and intellectuals, journalists, business 
elites and others as well as government officials and political leaders ‗acting in their 
private capacity‘ (Jones 2008, p. 2). 
 
For several decades a number of Asian think tanks have had research 
programmes concerning economic affairs of the Asia-Pacific and later, security 
cooperation. Their role has been at the earlier stages of regional cooperative efforts; 
that is, agenda setting. Rather than focusing on political and economic interests 
involved in the tangible features of building institutions of regional cooperation the 
focus of this paper is on prior efforts of agenda setting under taken through research, 
advocacy and networking of think tank staff with political elites. Through 
longstanding interaction at conferences or workshops, shared experiences have forged 
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strong links between institutes. The body of policy related research conducted by 
think tanks from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states, 
combined with their policy entrepreneurship, contributed to political understanding 
about the possible benefits of cooperation. In short, an ‗interpretative community‘ was 
built (Johnstone 2005). Examination of the debates on ideas of economic and security 
cooperation which preceded attempts at institutionalization, drives analytical attention 
to scholars, think tanks and other opinion leaders. 
 
Accordingly, this paper contributes to the literature on knowledge utilisation, 
specifically debates on the role of ideas in policy.  This literature has been criticised 
for assumptions that paradigmatic shifts or policy learning occurs as ideas are 
‗diffused‘ into the policy atmosphere without sufficient explanation of the 
mechanisms and agents through which diffusion occurs (Campbell 2008).  Regarding 
the knowledge-policy nexus, this paper does three things:  First, it pays attention to 
the organizational and individual actors who generate and advocated ideas on regional 
economic and security cooperation. Second, the paper draws attention to the 
mechanisms by which they informed policy – the dialogues sustained over the long 
term through a regional network of Institutes (ISIS). Third, through the policy process 
of ‗informal diplomacy‘ that became institutionalised, ideational policy entrepreneurs 
had access to government, business and other political elites and their decision 
making forums (Rouhana 1995). In sum, the paper outlines how an interpretative 
community emerged and operated. Some claims are made about the influence of 
ASEAN-ISIS albeit with the caveat that impact is variable, quite often intangible and 
is time and context contingent. Nevertheless, ASEAN-ISIS was an innovation 
spurring new institutions of regional governance via informal diplomacy.  
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To be sure, there has been recognition of the role of ASEAN-ISIS in the 
evolution of Asian regionalism. However, this literature is firmly based within the 
discipline of International Relations and International Political Economy. The 
epistemological precepts of both Realism and Liberalism put the ‗state‘ as prime unit 
of analysis. Realists would dismiss think tanks as irrelevant ‗bit players‘ in regional 
power plays or, at best, analytic support service to formal decision makers. Liberals 
are more likely to regard think tanks as tools for intergovernmental cooperation but 
likewise see them as secondary actors subject to the diktats and preferences of the 
state. Sovereignty and national organization is the structuring principle of societal and 
political action. Both theoretical traditions suffer from ‗methodological nationalism‘ 
and ‗state-centrism‘: non-state actors such as think tanks tend to be lost from 
analytical sight, and transnational processes disregarded. In the ‗avowedly state 
centric regional order, ASEAN-ISIS is seen by many as an anomaly‘ (Job 2004, p. 
241). 
 
Instead, it is the Constructivists and neo-Gramscians(Parmar, 2002)  that have 
highlighted the power of ideas and the role of research communities in developing 
normative understandings of regional identity. Even so, the object of analysis of 
constructivists has not been university research institutes, think tanks or their 
networks (exceptions being Capie & Taylor 2010; Job 2004). Instead, such studies 
tend to explain patterns of inter-state cooperation and the genesis of regional 
institutions.  An ontological separation between the scholar and the policy 
practitioner, between knowledge and power is often maintained. The research and 
intellectual interpretation that underpins conceptualisation of ‗regional cooperation‘ is 
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treated as an expert ‗input from an ‗epistemic community‘ (Rüland 2002), or a one-
way transmission of ideas into policy debate. 
 
This paper puts think tanks, intellectuals and the interpretative community – 
hence knowledge in the form of research, conferences and learned debate – at the 
centre of analysis as both agents and structures in the construction of region. 
Collectively, the South East Asian think tanks created a transnational network to 
sustain a governance space for regional cooperation. Thus, the network and its 
component organizations create, synthesize, legitimate, and disseminate useful 
knowledge played a significant role in the emerging regional governance system. In 
doing so, this paper is informed partially by constructivist thought but also draws 
upon ‗discourse institutionalism‘ (Schmidt 2008) and post-structuralist ‗interpretive 
policy studies‘ (Fischer 2003). 
 
Doing so, complicates the picture of ASEAN-ISIS as a non-state actor and 
exposes the status of the network and of informal diplomacy as resting on uneasy 
distinctions between ‗public‘ and ‗private‘ (Nesadurai and Stone 2000; Evans 2006) 
as well as a false division between knowledge and power. The research and analysis 
of the interpretative community is not ‗independent‘ or ‗autonomous‘ created in a 
domain separate from policy and politics that is only utilized when contracted or 
called upon by government actors, but deeply imbricated in policy making as a part of 
the mode of governance. Rather than a mere resource for other interests, knowledge 





Informal diplomacy is not state-centric and incorporates a more diverse range of 
actors than bureaucrats and politicians in international negotiations. Track One (T1) 
diplomacy are  diplomatic efforts of bureaucrats to resolve conflicts through official 
channels of government (Kaye 2007,  p. 5). However, official diplomats in Track One 
increasingly share the world stage with and make use of the growing cast of non-state 
actors.  What has become known as Track Two (T2) is an arena for non-governmental 
public action. T2 is symptomatic of the breakdown of traditional distinctions between 
foreign policy making and domestic policies that are mirrored in the academic fields 
of international relations and public policy respectively. Track Three (T3) diplomacy 
occurs among civil society groups. 
 
To complicate matters, the notion of Track One-and-a-Half (T1½) is also used 
to refer to describe something between an autonomous T2 and official diplomacy (see 
Nan, Druckman & El Hor 2009). The ideas of T1, T1½, T2 and T3 may be thought of 
as points on spectrum from state exclusive and often secret processes at one end to 
non-state public processes at the other.  Hence the preference in this paper for the 
term ‗informal diplomacy‘ given that T2 can morph into T1½ over time (Capie & 
Taylor 2010, pp. 365-67) and terminological nuances in different political cultures 
(Job 2004, p. 250; Rouhana 1995). 
 
T2 diplomacy entails ―unofficial dialogues often facilitated by an impartial 
Third Party and involving individuals with some connections to their respective 
official communities, focused on co-operative efforts to explore new ways to resolve 
differences over, or discuss new approaches to, policy-relevant issues‖ (Jones 2008, p. 
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4). It is conducted through closed dialogues ―either because of government 
uncertainty on how to proceed with sensitive discussions, or because of a lack of 
professional expertise‖ (Kim 2001, p. 1). It can include academics and intellectuals, 
journalists, business elites and others as well as officials ‗acting in their private 
capacity‘ (Ball, Milner & Taylor 2006, p. 175). This diplomacy usually takes place in 
an ‗off-the-record‘ setting.  That bureaucrats and politicians are acting in their private 
capacity is to be treated as a ‗polite fiction‘. Official and non-governmental 
participation in seminars, conferences and organizations is ‗mixed‘ or ‗blended‘ 
suggesting that the demarcation between official and unofficial involvement is unclear 
(Kraft 2000).  Some processes can be secretive such as the Oslo Process in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (Chataway 1998; Fisher 2006). In the ASEAN-ISIS case 
discussed here, T2 was a more public albeit quite exclusive process. 
 
 T2 is also different from ‗cultural diplomacy‘ with which intellectuals are often 
associated (Guilhot 2006). Cultural diplomacy usually originates from within civil 
society; that is, inspired by philanthropists, artists, sports enthusiasts or academics and 
has recently morphed into the ‗celebrity diplomacy‘ associated with aging rock stars 
(Cooper 2007).  Whilst track-two incorporates figures from civil society, it is distinct 
given the direct ties to, and sometimes long-term involvement of government officials 
and politicians in network building and patronage of university institutes and think 
tanks. T2 diplomacy is semi-official, a hybrid form of diplomacy that uses 
interlocutors between state actors. This occurs in situations where governments wish 
to express intentions or to suggest methods of resolving a diplomatic situation, but do 
not wish to express a formal position. In reverse, informal diplomacy also provides 
windows of opportunity for non-state actors or policy entrepreneurs from the 
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interpretive community to independently influence government by providing analysis 
or evaluations (Chataway 1998, p. 275; Lee 2009). 
 
Often regarded as independent organizations, think tanks can create neutral 
territory in the form of private dialogues where all parties to a concern can meet to 
discuss possibilities for policy. Think tanks play a facilitating role.  To an extent, they 
act as the ‗honest broker‘ inviting all interested parties to sit down behind closed 
doors to address a particular problem or proposal. They provide ‗a middle ground‘ 
where new forms of cooperation or controversial approaches to regional conflicts can 
be explored without fear of public exposure. Such an activity is useful to governments 
if the think tank is a prominent organisation of which foreigners have heard, and more 
importantly, if it can draw upon a network of distinguished states-people, business 
leaders, diplomats, military officers, experts and scholars (Parmar 2002). 
 
Informal dialogues are also valuable at times when for whatever reason, official 
dialogues are stalled or official relations strained (Chataway 1998, p. 273).   On the 
negative side, governments can use the track-two process and think tanks for the 
purposes of public symbolism.  Non-officials are given the impression that their 
advice and analysis is useful although this could be illusory. In mainstream 
international relations, sceptical assessments prevail among policy practitioners who 
see few if any concrete results from such unofficial endeavours (Jones 2008, p. 2; 
Kaye 2007, p. 3).  Some realists have a tendency to see dialogues and multilateral 
discussions as little more than ‗talking shops‘. That is, the various policy dialogues 
may offer little more than an amenable social and intellectual exercise for 
participants.  However, other realists would argue that their key concerns about 
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‗balance of power‘ continue to permeate T2 dialogues (Rüland 2002, p. 93; Lee 
2009). 
The ―realist‖ school tends to favour explanations of international affairs 
which stress interest based bargaining, the competition for power between 
states and zero-sum games. Social-psychological and constructivist 
theories tend to stress interpersonal relations, community building and the 
development of norms. While neither realism nor constructivism is so 
definitive as presented here, most Track Two is more comfortable in the 
latter tradition (Jones 2008, p. 11). 
 
The interpretive community framework adopted here goes one step further than 
constructivism to argue that policy is dependent on, and framed by, knowledge and 
ideational forces. In this perspective ―…it is a mistake to believe that T2 diplomacy is 
merely dialogue for dialogue‘s sake... (for) it creates a positive atmosphere that is 
conducive to the formation of regional identity (Kim 2001, p. 4). With the emphasis 
on consensus building, the filtering and re-assemblage of ideas and the socialization 
of elites, the focus is more on discourse and interpretation by the Institutes of norms 
of regional cooperation. That is, the routes and processes through which vague and 
general concepts are transformed into policy practices and political objectives 
(Schmidt 2008). 
 
A focus on discourses of informal diplomacy is to focus on the processes by 
which new ideas are created, moulded, elaborated, disseminated, expounded and 
adjusted to practical realities. A dilemma in the literature on the role of ideas in policy 
is the paucity of explanations about how, where, when and why new ideas emerge and 
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why they are picked up. That is, there is insufficient analytical attention directed to 
the mechanisms of ideational impact and the agency of actors in spreading ideas 
(Campbell 2008). The interpretive community of ASEAN-ISIS think tanks is one 
such mechanism.   
 
Outlined below, Asian think tanks and the ASEAN-ISIS network they built is 
the mechanism through which they became involved in informal diplomacy and built 
trust and understanding among South East Asia‘s policy communities. The network 
was a vehicle for policy learning.  It was not sufficient for ‗vague‘ ideas or policy 
research on security cooperation to be ‗diffused‘ through traditional processes of 
academic publication or public speaking for such ideas to find their way into policy 
discussion by serendipity. There is no automatic process that new policy ideas will 
seep into the consciousness of political and policy elites.  Instead, it is necessary to 
focus on the discursive constructions and agency of policy entrepreneurs, their 
research institutes and their networks. 
 
By no means is ASEAN-ISIS the first experiment in international networking 
among intellectuals to influence policy thinking. In the Cold War context, the cultural 
diplomacy of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Fondation pour une Entraide 
Intellectuelle Européenne aided ―the intellectual network building that contributed to 
the emergence of new political and cultural elites in Eastern Europe, providing them 
with political legitimacy and international contacts to move swiftly and powerfully 
into the post-Communist era‖ (Guilhot 2006, p. 408).   Similarly, there are many 
studies of the historical and contemporary role of think tanks in the policy process. 
Yet, such studies remain focused on OECD contexts. For instance, ‗expert 
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internationalist organizations‘ like the Council on Foreign Relations … has been at 
the heart of the American foreign policy establishment‖ (Parmar 2002, p. 241).  What 
is remarkable about the Southeast Asian institutes is their sustained long-term cross-
national collective action. And notwithstanding theoretical debates about their impact 
(or not) and the influence of ideas, the pace of informal dialogues accelerated, 
diversified and continues to attract governmental sponsorship. 
 
Southeast Asian Policy Institutes 
This paper cannot enter into the inconclusive definitional debates concerning 
‗think tank‘. Nevertheless, it is important to note that most of the Southeast Asian 
think tanks discussed here are different to their Western counterparts.  Anglo-
American think tanks are usually ‗non-governmental‘ bodies assumed to be 
intellectually autonomous and growing out of civil society. By contrast, the institutes 
discussed here have both formal and informal ties to national political elites and the 
state apparatus (Nesadurai 2011). ―State and non-state actors in ASEAN have 
proceeded in a very complex environment that displays authoritarian and democratic 
features simultaneously, a high degree of power monopoly on the part of a small 
circle of elites consolidated by the infrastructure of an interventionist state‖ (Manea 
2009, p. 37).  In some instances, the ASEAN institutes may be better described as 
GONGOs – governmentally organised NGOs, or MANGOs – manipulated NGOs. It 
is the case that many Western think tanks (like the US Institute of Peace) are largely 
funded by government, as is also the case of SIPRI in Sweden, and on this basis might 
be categorised as MANGOs.  However, what is important is both the liberal political 
culture and open societies in which they operate, as well as close adherence to 
international best practice in social science research. Needless to say, long-term 
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dynamics towards democratisation in South East Asia alongside ‗knowledge for 
development‘ capacity building can alter over time whether or not institutes are 
classed as MANGOs. 
 
In most Southeast Asian countries, the first generation think tanks were elite, 
establishment bodies like the Singaporean Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) 
(Sandhu 1991, p. 3). The regionally oriented Institute of South East Asian Studies 
(ISEAS) in Singapore and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
Jakarta were created with government funding and patronage. Sometimes, they were 
set up directly within government or as a non-departmental public body – a quango. 
For instance, the Philippine Institute of Development Studies is an economic think 
tank established by government decree in 1977. In other words, their primary purpose 
was to provide information and act as a sounding board for government. 
 
When ASEAN-ISIS was rising to prominence in the 1990s, Asian think tanks 
were considered by many Western observers to have an unhealthily close relationship 
with government. Some critics claimed that these bodies were ‗state-directed‘ 
(Jayasuriya 1994). Their importance to the state was in their capacity to amplify 
messages that come from the top down to the rest of society. Consequently, Asian 
think tanks tended to be ―regime enhancing‖ rather than ―regime critical‖ (Yamamoto 
& Hubbard 1995, p. 45). This also applied to regional institutional initiatives as think 
tanks began to engage in policy dialogues across borders. Thus while depicting their 
dialogues as T2, in reality the close political connections of think tank directors of 
that time suggested their activities were rather more T1½. 
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The launch of ASEAN in 1967 and its slow consolidation over the 1970s and 
1980s gradually generated a regional source of demand for policy analysis. The 
ASEAN secretariat has lacked sufficient strength and staff to conduct policy research 
and advisory functions. There has been a policy analysis vacuum in the formal 
structures of regional governance. This lacunae provided a window of opportunity for 
think tanks in Southeast Asia (as well as researchers in universities and elsewhere) to 
provide research and analysis on security and economic co-operation via ASEAN-
ISIS. This does not mean that T2 displaces T1. However, ASEAN was reliant on the 
Institutes (and other actors) to provide the convening, the conference organisation, the 
dialogue vehicles and other activities that allowed the ‗habit of dialogue‘ to become a 
reality and on-going practice. 
 
The ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies was launched as a 
formal association in 1988 (although there were informal meetings in years earlier).  
It was founded by think tanks in four of the core ASEAN countries:  
 Centre for Strategic and International Studies – CSIS Indonesia 
 Institute for Strategic and International Studies –  ISIS Malaysia 
 Singapore Institute for International Affairs – SIIA 
 Institute for Security and International Studies – ISIS Thailand 
 Plus an individual, Professor Carolina Hernandez , subsequently Institute for 
Strategic and Development Studies – ISDS in the Philippines from 1991. 
The ASEAN-ISIS network is legally designated as an NGO. At the domestic level, 
however, most institutes are linked to the state via funding relationships or legal 
location within the bureaucratic apparatus. For instance, ISIS Malaysia directors often 
acted as speech writers for their Prime Minister. Such formal and informal links have 
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made informal diplomacy a very effective mode of policy influence. Nevertheless, 
these institutes are both policy institutes and scholarly bodies, although the balance 
differs from one nation to the next.  ISIS-Thailand was originally founded in 1981 at 
Chulalongkorn University before acquiring independent status.  Likewise ISDS was 
founded by scholars from the University of the Philippines. University or NGO status 
also bestows some legitmacy via the presumed independence and autonomy of these 
institutes. 
 
The objectives of ASEAN-ISIS are to: (i) strengthen and increase regional 
cooperation in the development of research; (ii) increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of research by intensified communication and coordination; and (iii) 
contribute to ASEAN cooperation by promoting public knowledge and understanding 
of problems and issues faced by the ASEAN communities. ASEAN-ISIS has three 
flagship activities: 
1. Asia Pacific Roundtable (APR) for Confidence Building and Conflict 
Resolution from 1987 
2. ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights since 1994 
3. ASEAN People‘s Assembly in 2000 
The Asia Pacific Roundtable is its oldest activity and most closely associated with T2 
diplomacy (Soesastro, Joewono & Hernandez 2006, p. 2). Indeed, it has been 
described as the ‗grand-daddy‘ of all T2 in the region (Butcher 2009). Hosted by ISIS 
Malaysia, APR has ―the consistent and unwavering patronage of successive Prime 
Ministers, Deputy Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Malaysia … (who) have 
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delivered the bulk of the keynote addresses at the APR since its inception‖.1 The other 
two activities emerged much later and these activities engage with civil society to a 
greater degree.  Unlike APR, the People‘s Assembly as a T3 venture did not again 
traction with official ASEAN. 
 
With the widening of ASEAN to the new member countries of Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Brunei, new institutes were brought into the fold: 
 Institute for International Relations in Hanoi 
 Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace 
 Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies 
 Institute of Foreign Affairs, Laos 
The development of the regional network over a decade and growing recognition of it 
as a space and place for policy dialogue had the effect of prompting institutional 
development at the national level in those countries where think tank development 
was not known.  There was a ‗boomerang effect‘ of regional dialogue and networking 
spurring national-level institutional development in order that the new national 
institution could participate in the regional debates on economic integration and 
security cooperation. That is, a replication process to consolidate the network 
structure paralleling the formal intergovernmental ASEAN organisation.  
 
A “Relentless Conversation”: Regional Identity and Community Construction 
Think tank manipulation of political and cultural symbols contributes to the 
formation of collective identities at the regional level.  This idea draws on Wendt's 
(1994) constructivist hypothesis that state identity can be endogenous to the process 
                                                 
1
 http://www.isis.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=263&Itemid=186   
Accessed 4
th
 February 2011.   
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of structured interaction between states. That is, states often share similar 
interpretations of their environment.  States also depend on each other, in part, for the 
creation of these interpretations; and furthermore, the strategic interaction of states 
further contributes to shared understandings. 
 
A shared idea of regional identity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the states of the region to establish a framework for political and economic 
cooperation or harmonisation of policies. Political leaders of Asian countries have 
often talked of ―Asian values‖ in their regional security community or economic 
dialogues.  That is, ―states are engaging in discursive practices designed to express 
and/or to change ideas about who ‗the self‘ of self-interested collective action is‖ 
(Wendt 1994, p. 391).   
 
Engaging in cooperative acts can become a self-reinforcing dynamic that allows 
actors to reassess core beliefs and come to new understandings. By teaching 
themselves and others to cooperate, they effectively create new identities.  Part of the 
learning and interactive process occurs through the strategic narrative practices 
designed to persuade others to change conceptions of their interests.  The greater the 
degree of conflict in the international system, the more likely states will fear each 
other and defend their ―egoistic identities‖ (Wendt 1994). By contrast, where there 
are positive shared understandings and mutual recognition of sovereignty among 
states, there is potential for collective identity formation.  States are also more likely 
to identify their interests with others, when they share a common fate and cannot act 
unilaterally to undo that fate. Aspects of egoistic identities increasingly become 
redundant provided states do not respond defensively to their vulnerability. The 
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discourses of cooperation can aid collective action by helping create a sense of 
solidarity. The discourse of ASEAN-ISIS became an elite system of meaning for the 
policy community that ordered the production of interpretations of the social world in 
the context of the post Cold War security vacuum in the region. A major concern 
―was the need to prepare ASEAN to anticipate impending changes in the regional and 
global order‖ (Sukma 2006, p. 91). 
 
One area where NGOs, think tanks and experts can be found is in regional 
‗interpretive communities‘. However, these communities are not neatly defined. 
Instead, there are overlapping communities; those involved in the economic 
cooperation movement in East Asia (Nesadurai 2011) also sometimes feature in 
ASEAN-ISIS debates on security or human rights. In the words of one Japanese think 
tank director, these communities develop regional networks ―thus providing 
encouraging opportunities of establishing regional institutional linkages and 
facilitating individual networks and collaborative relationships, a prerequisite ... of 
community building in Asia Pacific‖ (Yamamoto 1995, p. 3).  At issue is whether the 
actors within the ASEAN-ISIS network were acting solely in the interests of their 
states with their research and advocacy of Asian cooperation, or whether the ASEAN-
ISIS affiliates developed their own raison d’etre as an interpretive community. 
 
An interpretive community rests upon ‗professional interpreters‘. In the case 
here, think tank directors, research fellows, university scholars and others operating in 
ASEAN-ISIS.  
All professional interpreters …are situated within an institutional 
context, and interpretative activity makes sense only in terms of the 
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purposes of the enterprise in which the interpreter is participating. 
Furthermore, a given text is always encountered in a situation or field of 
practice, and therefore can only be understood in light of the position it 
occupies in that enterprise. …Thus, interpretation is constrained… by 
the ―cultural assumptions within which both texts and contexts take 
shape for situated agents‖. Meaning is produced neither by the text nor 
by the reader but by the interpretative community in which both are 
situated (Johnstone 2005, p. 189 quoting Stanley Fish).  
The texts of ASEAN-ISIS are the web-sites, meetings, publications and policy 
commentary (briefs, speech writing, etc) produced by the interpreters.  The situations 
and ‗field of practice‘ are constituted through T1, T1½ and T2 networks where think 
tanks articulated new meanings of region.   
 
Asian think tanks in general (not only ASEAN-ISIS) played a catalytic role in 
region building because they represented an intersection for the movement of opinion 
formers and decision makers. That is, a cross-road for policy entrepreneurs or what 
has elsewhere been called ‗norm entrepreneurs‘ (Job, 2004) or sometimes ‗epistemic 
communities‘ (Acharya 2004; Kim 2001; Rüland 2002)). ASEAN-ISIS ideas and 
interests transcended the nation-state. This network and others provided forums where 
new social realities were constructed, debated and interpreted as individuals came 
into contact and interacted.  
 
The ‗interpretive communities‘ analytical frame emerges from a post-
structuralist sensibility. That is, ideas have independent influence. Meaning-making 
has structural consequences in shaping or limiting the frame of reference for policy 
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making or what is considered politically viable. Power and capacity for change comes 
from the idea itself irrespective of who or what articulates that discourse. This sets it 
in distinction from both the norm entrepreneur concept and epistemic community 
framework which portray ideas, norms or expert knowledge as a resource utilised by 
an agent.  Power or change capabilities are seen to reside in the individual or 
institutional agent that advocates on behalf of state, communal or corporate interests. 
Both approaches presuppose an agent who socially constructs identities and interests 
through instrumental actions. This is not to negate the role of those actors or 
institutions that articulate the ideas, and the concern of the paper is to address 
ASEAN-ISIS as one important mechanism articulating concepts of region.  By doing 
so, over time and through multiple discourses and venues, the idea becomes an 
organising logic or co-ordinative paradigm. Expert discourses, such as the ‗ASEAN 
Way‘, become a structuring force. 
 
Rather than seeking legalistic and formal institutions (such as characterised in 
the development of European Union), Asian economic and security cooperation is of 
a more informal, unstructured and consensual character.  It ―has been called the 
‗ASEAN Way‘ (and) was presented by some Asian leaders as a culturally-rooted 
notion, focusing on organizational minimalism, avoidance of legalism, and an 
emphasis on consultations and consensus decision-making‖ (Acharya & Johnstone, 
2007, p. 34). The non-governmental T2 dialogue activities of think tanks are not 
simply a manifestation of the style of Asian cooperation. From a discourse 
institutionalism perspective they are constitutive of regional cooperation.  That is, ‗a 
relentless conversation of Asean that may have been the essential ingredient in 
creating … meaningful entities…‖ (Milner 2007, p. 579 my italics).  
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By no means is this a smooth linear process. Official reception of new ideas is not 
automatic and ―government officials are often skeptical or even disdainful of Track 2, 
which they often see as full of ‗wannabes‘ or ‗hasbeens‘ seeking to play 
intergovernmental roles themselves and dispensing unsolicited advice‖ (Morrison 
2004, p. 550). The identity building dialogues, Roundtables and regional workshops 
are indeterminate and easily unsettled. The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis saw funds 
dry up for regional activities when states reverted to their focus on national interests 
of economic recovery (Ball, Milner & Taylor 2006, p. 176). Egoistic identities re-
asserted.  Weathering the current global financial crisis better, and propelled over the 
past decade by non-traditional security threats  ASEAN-ISIS adopted new research 
agendas for regional cooperation and coordination in areas such as piracy and the 
maritime commons, disease (especially in the context of SARS and Avian flu) and 
environmental crime. 
 
ASEAN ISIS influence is at the earlier stages of regional cooperative efforts, in 
agenda setting. The institutes perform three important tasks. Firstly, think tanks act as 
innovators by providing new policy ideas about economic or security co-operation at 
the regional level. Secondly, think tanks broadcast these ideas and their policy 
recommendations. They start the ball rolling for a ‗habit of dialogue‘ (Sukma 2006, p. 
89). Thirdly, through their networking, joint research and other collaborative ventures 
intra-regionally, and for some through their involvement in the political processes of 
their home states, think tanks can help shape the political choices made by state elites. 
 
 21 
To-date, most analysis has concentrated on the more tangible institution building 
exercises and disputes of business and government actors concerning APEC (Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation) with the research community tending to be portrayed 
as playing a subsidiary analytical service role.  This is not unusual. As think tanks are 
considered to be NGOs operating at the margins of politics with only the powers of 
persuasion at their disposal they have not been accorded significant influence in 
policy making (but see Acharya 2004; Nesadurai 2011). Another reason why non-
state action is lost from sight is that it operates primarily at a discursive level. This is 
labelled in the region as the ‗habit of dialogue‘. The phrase pertains to the meetings 
and dialogues, the workshop reports and conference proceedings as well as the 
countless informal discussions and web-site postings that are all part of the ‗relentless 
conversation‘. This long term ‗conversation‘ is process related activity.  As such, it is 
relatively ephemeral and less concrete than tangible new institutions created by 
governments such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).  
 
Generally, multilateral security institutions have been slow to emerge in the 
Asia-Pacific. The Cold War in Asia was conducted through a set of bilateral 
relationships with a resulting absence of European style alliances.  The end of the 
Cold War and the rapid decay of the former communist regimes provided a window 
of opportunity for new thinking in security cooperation. The formation of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF),
2
 the Asia-Pacific region‘s first attempt at multilateral security 
cooperation, illustrates this clearly, with scholars explaining its formation as the 
                                                 
2
 Membership of ARF includes the ASEAN states and dialogue partners -- the USA, the EU, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, Russia, China, Laos and Papua New Guinea.   
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outcome of both strategic power shifts and leadership provided by middle powers, in 
this case by ASEAN (Acharya 2004). 
 
The ARF operates on the basis of cooperative security rather than common 
security (Dewitt 1994). Unlike common security approaches, cooperative security is 
less fixated on the rapid development of formal multilateral institutions, preferring the 
establishment of habits of dialogue. The ARF replaced the Cold War security 
structure (which was based primarily on bipolar power balancing and bilateral 
alliances) with a multilateral diplomatic approach that emphasizes consultation, 
inclusiveness and engaging ―adversaries‖. The latter has been termed ―soft 
regionalism‖ or ‗soft dialogue‘ as opposed to the ‗hard dialogue‘ associated with 
formal institutions (Acharya 2004). 
 
While these dialogues have been strongly influenced by European ideas, the 
evolving discourse necessarily has a distinctly Asian flavour and regionally specific 
institutional ‗field of practice‘. For instance, the main elements of a cooperative 
security discourse include emphasizing political dialogue at both the governmental 
and non-governmental levels, a non-confrontational approach to dispute settlement, 
establishing comfort levels, frequent consultations and consensual decision-making. 
In short, ideas about common and cooperative security have been translated or 
interpreted and then adjusted, modified and adapted in unique ways (Kjaer & 
Pedersen 2001, p. 221) to the particular regional and historical context of East Asia. 
That is, ‗the ASEAN Way‘ and a home grown Asian strategic culture. 
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T2 processes, especially through ASEAN-ISIS, have been crucial to the 
leadership role played by ASEAN in establishing the ARF. This was significant as 
ASEAN had generally been averse to multilateral security cooperation in the past. As 
Schmidt (2008) argues discursive institutionalism offers insights into why political 
institutions change by zooming in not only on sentient agents‘ cognitive and 
normative ideas about what they were doing and why at different levels of 
generality—policy (in this case, security cooperation), program (the ARF), and 
philosophy (ASEAN Way)—but also on their discursive interactions regarding who 
spoke to whom, where, when, and why in the process of generating those ideas in a 
‗coordinative discourse‘ of policy construction. ASEAN ISIS generated a venue for 
‗communicative‘ discourse of public deliberation and their conferences, analysis and 
publications provided one source of legitimization for subsequent policy positions. 
 
By taking discourse as the object of analysis, and interpretation and persuasion as the 
source of policy change, the role of regional experts and think tanks comes into 
analytical sight. Discourse is a system that, through language or text, or a set of 
statements or social interactions, structures the way we perceive reality. Discourse 
constrains perceptions. It shapes how groups respond to particular situations and how 
some things come to be regarded as normal or legitimate – the ‗taken-for-granted‘ 
features of a social order. Discourse institutionalism (Pedersen & Kjaer 2001) and the 
interpretive turn in policy studies (Fischer 2003) regard processes of meaning-making 




This process of opinion formation and consensus building over decades is 
another reason why the impact of unofficial actors can be under-estimated. Many of 
the initiatives and policy proposals of the ASEAN-ISIS for security cooperation have 
touched on areas where ASEAN governments were known to have serious 
reservations; for example, ideas to convene a multilateral security dialogue go to the 
core of sovereign insecurities.  As one Singaporean insider to ASEAN ISIS argues: ―It 
is an on-going process… rather than episodic undertaking … a process that shadows 
the official inter-governmental, state processes‖ (Tay 2006, p. 129). 
 
This ‗shadow‘ process is aside from public scrutiny where its relevance and 
influence is caught in the multiplicity of conversations, briefings and professional 
relationships built through successive meetings. Indeed, T1 to T2 dialogues and 
research activities throughout Asia have proliferated so extensively that the Japan 
Centre for International Exchange (another government supported think tank) 
maintained the Dialogue and Research Monitor to map the web of meetings and 
dialogues. The web-site provided an inventory of trends in research dialogues 
concerning East Asia and it lists major multilateral governmental and 
nongovernmental meetings and significant studies. In 2007, marking the 40th 
anniversary of ASEAN, the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, and the 10th anniversary 
of the Asian financial crisis, there were 278 Track 1 and 284 Track 2 dialogues, as 




                                                 
3
   DRM: http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/  Accessed 26
th
 February 2010.   
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The interpretive community has many institutional bases, and it evolves over time. 
Yet in terms of setting the agenda towards economic and security cooperation in the 
1990s this community consolidated in regional non-governmental organizations. This 
is not to suggest an uncontested or consensual pattern of research or debate within  
interpretive communities. Significant divisions among scholars, institutions and 
nations exist.  Even so, the close personal ties and friendships between the directors 
and senior fellows of the ASEAN-ISIS institutes, particularly in its earlier days, is 
notable. The social capital that they built has been recounted by a number of ‗insiders‘ 
in a book on Twenty Two Years of ASEAN ISIS (Soesastro, Joewono, and Hernandez 
2006) with retrospectives from self-dubbed ‗ASEAN thinkers‘ and ‗true believers in 
ASEAN‘. They saw each other regularly at the annual Asia Pacific Roundtable and in 
between at issue specific meetings and workshops. It was a tight community. Today, 
they are concerned about generational renewal to bring younger scholars into 
ASEAN-ISIS leadership positions (Butcher 2009; Sukma 2006, p. 95). 
 
Notwithstanding on-going scholarly debates and intellectual divisions, the body 
of policy related research conducted by think tanks from the ASEAN states, combined 
with their policy entrepreneurship, contributed to wider political understanding about 
the possible benefits of regional cooperation. The main protagonists – think tanks – 
organized their policy advocacy through ASEAN-ISIS.  Their discursive practices 
have helped create new regional modes of governance via informal diplomacy as well 
as opening transnational spaces for policy making by making discursive and social 
sense of that space. 
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As noted above, state centric accounts of Liberals and Realists are likely to see 
non-state research actors playing a marginal role in the creation of multilateral 
institutions. For instance, questions that dispute the relevance of ASEAN-ISIS would 
ask – in a positivist vein – what is the evidence of causal impact of ideas in creating or 
reforming institutions or policy?  This is often entails mapping and measuring in a 
quantitative quest of proof of ideational impact. Such methodologies are lacking (Job 
2004, p. 243); ―only indirect inferences can be made‖ (Lee 2009, p. 207). 
Measurement of impact of regional discourse is likely to remain elusive. This is due 
to numerous other intervening variables that muddy the causal path between ideas and 
policy (Rouhana 1995, pp. 264-65). 
 
Even so, the state-centric approach does provide an antidote to over-determining 
the role of ideas.  Both the Australian and Canadian governments were also early 
advocates of ARF.  Other scholars have argued that the ARF was established for real 
politik concerns of ASEAN to balance the power of China and the US in a 
multilateral framework. Interpretive accounts do not deny the salience of power-plays 
and material interests, but posit that ideational power cannot not be forgotten in 
shaping interests. 
 
The „ASEAN Way‟ of the Intellectuals 
ASEAN-ISIS is registered with the ASEAN Secretariat as an ASEAN NGO.  Its 
Charter mandates that only research institutes based in ASEAN member countries 
may join ASEAN-ISIS. However, ASEAN-ISIS also maintains extensive regional and 
international networks of institutional linkages with leading think tanks outside 
ASEAN. ASEAN-ISIS is non-governmental but as noted above its non-governmental 
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status is questionable. But is it a MANGO?  As this quote from Paul Evans, a long 
standing Canadian participant-observer in ASEAN ISIS events and expert on Asian 
security indicates, the distinctions between official and unofficial are very cloudy: 
In structural terms, while it has been an avowed leader of non-
governmental or unofficial initiatives, the dividing line between non-
governmental and governmental is thin to non-existent in several of the 
participating institutes. Some institutes are based within governmental 
ministries and led by government officials. For example, the Institute of 
International Relations in Hanoi is part of the Vietnamese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The same is the case in Laos. The management and staff 
at ISIS Malaysia are government employees and the government provides 
the lion‘s share of the Institute‘s funding. At the other end of the spectrum, 
ISDS in the Philippines has a loose connection to the University of the 
Philippines but is independent from government and the university in 
funding, personnel and operations. The Singapore Institute of International 
Affairs is a self-standing and self-financing organization, though does 
receive government funding. CSIS in Jakarta has evolved from having a 
close relationship to government to being an autonomous institution in the 
past decade (Evans 2006, pp. 99-100).  
The demarcating line between unofficial T2 and official T1diplomacy is blurred to 
become indistinguishable (Ball, Milner & Taylor, 2006: 184).  The grey areas in the 
status of ASEAN ISIS as part public, part private is very convenient for all parties to 
informal diplomacy. The distinctions between T1, T2 and increasingly T3 are more 
than symbolic and have functional value. ―This ‗disclaimer‘ erects a mythical 
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separation of private and public diplomacy and allows sensitive issues to be discussed 
without the burden of official accountability‖ (Kim 2001, p. 2). 
 
Within the tense security environs of the early 1990s, ASEAN-ISIS was able to 
emphasise its non-governmental status – neutral territory at the regional level – in 
promoting sensitive ideas and policy recommendations on security cooperation.  At 
the same time, the (semi-)official status of key members attending T2 activities and 
dialogues meant that state interests were protected and pursued in a ‗safe‘ setting. In 
reality, the public and the private were very blurred, deliberately so. Through the 
symbolic distinctions of T1 and T2, the ‗mythical separation‘ of official and informal 
diplomacy has practical advantages in creating forums for discussion of threat 
perceptions and other delicate issues in low risk settings. 
 
Influence has been a gradual process. And it has not been a constant one.  The 
first steps towards substantive engagement with ASEAN came in 1991. The ASEAN-
Institutes meeting of that year in Jakarta produced a memorandum – A Time for 
Initiative – that was not only timely in its recommendations but captured the 
imagination of not only ASEAN Governments but also ASEAN Dialogue partners 
like Japan, Australia and Canada in establishing an arrangement for the Asia Pacific 
like the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Inspiration was 
however, a CSCE-like ―tool kit minus the normative substance‖ concerning 
democracy and human rights as it would have directly confronted the ASEAN 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs (Rüland 2002, p. 89; Manea 2009). 
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ASEAN-ISIS ideas were submitted to the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore 
in 1992 as well as in a series of constructive proposals to ASEAN governments to 
initiate an official dialogue process at the end of each ASEAN-PMC (Post Ministerial 
Conference). The official ASEAN response was cautious but not dismissive since 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed to study the idea further. ASEAN-ISIS was 
attempting to establish a new regional agenda and ―was somewhat ahead of the 
official position" (Kerr 1994, p. 403). It was not until two years later after the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting that the ASEAN Regional Forum was formally established. 
 
The ARF's creation in September 1993 was greatly influenced by a climate of 
opinion generated through T2 activities. Indeed, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
acknowledged the role played by non-governmental bodies in the genesis of ARF and 
in particular, commended ASEAN-ISIS for exploring and promoting the ideas that 
enhanced security cooperation (Kerr 1994, p. 397). The ASEAN Secretariat states on 
its web-site: ―Efforts of the Governments to foster an enduring regional order, 
stability and prosperity are supplemented by various non governmental institutions on 
the non-official track. …. ASEAN has found useful several studies and proposals put 
forward by the various institutions represented in the ASEAN- ISIS.‖4 
 
ASEAN-ISIS built a set of multilateral processes through which new thinking in 
security cooperation could be informally and openly discussed before these ideas 
were taken up at the official level. While these new ideas have been strongly 
influenced by European ideas of ‗common security‘, ‗cooperative‘ and 
‗comprehensive security‘, ‗confidence building measures‘ and ‗transparency‘ (Dewitt 
                                                 
4
  ASEAN Secretariat: http://www.aseansec.org/9545.htm accessed 3rd February 2011.  
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1994), the evolving discourse has a distinct regional or Asian character. This enabled 
these new ideas to be accepted at the official level by ASEAN states. 
  
As ASEAN political leaders usually only meet where there is an official summit, 
such informal dialogues are all the more important. The ASEAN Regional Forum 
meets only once every summer for a day. National leaders do not have time to become 
acquainted with the intricacies of issues, or have the luxury to appreciate the reasons 
for different perceptions. Consequently, the T2 community becomes an important 
vehicle for building constructive relationships at a lower bureaucratic level. As 
ASEAN ISIS evolved, it also moved in different directions. T2 widened beyond the 
Southeast Asian nations to embrace a broader concept of region than that composed 
of the ASEAN states. 
 
A Wider T2 Process 
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is another 
T2 initiative. Established 1993, it also complements the governmental (T1) 
mechanisms for developing security cooperation. It is a more diverse grouping than 
ASEAN-ISIS on two fronts: first it is of wider national reach and second, CSCAP 
convenors are university, think tank and governmental
5
 (and other relevant 
individuals such as consultants, senior journalists or leading corporate executives) 
whereas ASEAN-ISIS is constituted by think tanks. 
 
CSCAP was established with the purpose of serving as the ARFs Track Two 
mechanism‖. This has involved delivering "the necessary support activities for the 
                                                 
5
 CSCAP Member Committees: http://www.cscap.org/index.php?page=member-committees-page 
accessed 1
st
 February 2011. 
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ARF agenda, and make recommendations which are relevant for policy 
implementation" (Kerr 1994, p. 404), improved communication among like minded 
states as well as more ambitious objectives of instituting "cooperative security 
approaches" that transcend ideological divisions and existing alliance structures.  It 
provides a more structured process for regional confidence building.  CSCAP does 
not aspire to become the region's sole track-two channel but to help coordinate efforts 
and avoid redundancy.  
 
The idea for CSCAP was first aired in 1992 at a conference on "Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific" in Seoul. This meeting was jointly arranged by 
Pacific Forum, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Seoul Forum for 
International Affairs and ASEAN-ISIS. Thus, ASEAN-ISIS played a key role in 
creating CSCAP. However, participation in CSCAP was extended to all countries and 
territories of the Asia-Pacific. The establishment of CSCAP has not been without 
difficulty or some skepticism.  There were the usual teething problems as it sought 
funding and members and as founding partners tinkered with structures and 
administration.  Concerns that CSCAP represented an overly optimistic attempt to 
promote cooperation that does not sufficiently appreciate the tensions and hostilities 
that continue to abound in the region have been borne out. These include unresolved 
sovereignty and territorial conflicts, uncertainty about the extent of US commitment 
to the region, anxiety over the arms build-up in China and arms proliferation in 
general. Furthermore, whilst there is an apparent 'habit of dialogue' in Southeast Asia, 
such a habit is weak in Northeast Asia. More fundamental collective action 
difficulties arise from the differing perceptions of the enterprise held by a larger 
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number of participants (that also includes Russia, the US and India) than is the case in 
ASEAN-ISIS. 
 
ASEAN-ISIS also broadened but in terms of its research agenda to include a 
wider array of human security and development issues. This has included partnering 
with parallel T2 processes like the ASEAN Economic Forum. ASEAN-ISIS also 
engaged with civil society bodies through APA to promote ‗regionalism from below‘.   
However, the T2 to T3 process has had a short and chequered history leading ―some 
CSOs to accuse ASEAN-ISIS of restricting rather than opening channels for dialogue 
with ASEAN‖ (Collins 2008). Participatory regionalism also requires ASEAN 
governments and officials to create space for these groups in ASEAN deliberations. 
In reality, ―ASEAN has not always been supportive of APA‖. Moreover, when 
ASEAN officials attended APA Annual Forums ―in their private capacity‖ to allow 
for a frank exchange of views this happened rarely ―because many officials could not 
step out of their official roles‖ (Nesdaurai 2011).  
 
The establishment of a ‗habit of dialogue‘ is an important but intangible 
outcome of the ASEAN-ISIS. It has built a history among participants encouraging 
loyalty and learning.  In other words, the Association has helped build an esprit de 
corps and a sense of ASEAN solidarity among members. Information is shared and 
views on sensitive matters are aired helping to clear doubts and uncertainties if not to 
resolve tensions.  Its activities promote information exchange and transparency in the 
region. Admittedly, this sense of identity is a fragile one that has encountered many 
more set-backs and challenges than can be conveyed in this paper. Yet, there is 
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enough going on for a former Singaporean parliamentarian to speak of ASEAN 
identity construction: 
ASEAN ISIS and the individuals involved in their work have in some 
ways been fore runners in creating a sense of the region. … Moreover, 
they are often less closely wedded to a national interest perspective, and 
can try to see the common interest of the region as a whole. Through the 
media, and in their various conferences and symposia, the ASEAN ISIS 
think tanks promote the understanding of ASEAN (Tay 2006, p. 126). 
 
The notion of ASEAN identity and community raises the question of the identity 
of whom?  From its inception, the ASEAN project has been very much an elite affair 
or an ‗exclusive club‘.  Not until after the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s did 
civil society engagements become recognized and routinised. Indeed, it was not until 
the Bali Concord in 2003 – some 30+ years after ASEAN‘s establishment – that an 
ASEAN Community was proclaimed and recognised that ASEAN was founded on 
three pillars: the ASEAN Economic Community; the ASEAN Security Community 
and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. This third pillar is testimony to a 
perceived political need to engage the wider ASEAN community beyond its business 
and political elites (Caballero-Anthony 2006. p. 55). Through its flagship ASEAN 
People‘s Assembly, ASEAN-ISIS wanted to help build the third pillar but APA was 
one contested by alternative regional gatherings of civil society associations (Collins 
2008, p. 322). ASEAN-ISIS suspended APA in 2009. Moreover, the idea of an 
ASEAN Community remains an elite civil society project which is very weakly 
embedded and barely recognised in national societies of the region. 
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The success of ASEAN-ISIS in the 1990s prompted imitation as well as 
replication (such as CSCAP or the Asia-Pacific Water Forum Regional Consultation 
Meetings).  Other venues of T2 have become equally important in regional debates on 
community building if the DRM inventory is taken as a guide to the multiple 
institutional bases of the interpretive community. The innovative agenda-setting 
influence of ASEAN-ISIS region construction may also be time contingent. Today it 
operates in a different environment from the early 1990s: At a domestic level, national 
bureaucracies have matured, professionalised and increasingly function with in-house 
research and analytic capacity. At the regional levels of ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific, 
ASEAN-ISIS is now only one venue for T2 activity.  New T2 dialogues have entered 
the field of which NEAT – the Network of East Asian Think Tanks – is but one 
example and the Sentosa Round Table another. Additionally, the Shangri-La dialogue 
convened by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies touts itself 
as ―the most important regular gathering of defence professionals in the region and 
has become a vital annual fixture in the diaries of Asia-Pacific defence ministers and 
their civilian and military chiefs of staff‖6  and is seen by some as having over-taken 
ASEAN-ISIS (Butcher 2009; Capie & Taylor 2010). Finally, regional institution 
building is subject not only to the persuasiveness of interpretative communities, but 
also to the dynamics of material interests and power plays of political and economic 
interests. As noted by one observer of CSCAP. ―official responses to T2 suggestions 
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Analysis of the regional think tank networking of ASEAN-ISIS informs our 
conceptual understanding on the knowledge-policy nexus on three fronts: First, 
analysis of bodies like the ASEAN-ISIS directs attention to the agency of researchers 
and research institutes. That is, what they said and wrote, the web-sites established, 
the workshops and meetings organised, as well as the personal relationships and 
professional ties built. Second, their analytical work was not allowed to simply diffuse 
into the public realm, but was actively propelled into policy circles through a very 
entrepreneurial regional network.  Third, and subsequently, the non-governmental 
networking was institutionalised as a (semi-)private policy process that ‗shadowed‘ 
official deliberations via T2 diplomacy. 
 
The achievements of ASEAN-ISIS were to create and help sustain a regional 
interpretive community. Indicators of ASEAN-ISIS impact are numerous: (1) it was 
an early entrant to, and initiated new T2 processes; (2) it built a regional network that 
continues to prosper; (3) it prompted the launch of new think tanks in Laos and 
Cambodia in order for those countries to have representation in the network; (4) it 
attracted official patronage from national governments; (5) it has institutionalized 
meetings with the ASEAN Senior Official Meeting (SOM), has acknowledgement of 
the role of ASEAN-ISIS in the Joint Communiqués of the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meetings, and the solicitation by ASEAN SOM of ASEAN-ISIS views on issues that 
ASEAN senior officials would like to have studied; and (6) developed collaborative 
research and dialogues that have attracted scholarly interest. Had it failed, the 
ASEAN-ISIS would have slowly retreated into the academic domain or disintegrated. 
Instead, it expanded with new activities that attract funding and patronage. Others 
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with certainty in the power of ideas have copied ASEAN ISIS via additional T2 
networks. All this suggests that ideational work is essential to institutional innovation. 
 
As a consequence, the ontological separation between the scholar-researcher 
and the policy practitioner – exemplified by the very terms T1 and T2 – is de-
stabilised and undermined. Instead, knowledge and power are seen as intertwined and 
inseparable. ‗Region‘ and institutions of regional cooperation first needed to be 
‗thought‘ – researched, critiqued, debated – before they could be created. In this 
framework, the research/interpretive community that is drawn from universities and 
think tanks becomes a central component to governance. This is in contra-distinction 
to the Realist and Liberal perspectives that would regard the think tanks and T2 
networks as ‗interlocutors‘ or ‗ideas brokers‘ between the research world and the 
state; that is, ―reinforcement for T1 processes‖ (Morrison 2004, p. 551).  
 
The research/interpretative community is not based in a separate or independent 
domain distinct from policy and politics feeding ideas in a one way transmission 
process to decision makers. Nor are think tanks and networks merely hinged or fused 
onto political processes to legitimate inter-governmental cooperation.  Instead, they 
are inextricably bound with such processes. This is not just blurred lines between 
public-private. Rather, knowledge is mutually constituted with governance.  
Nevertheless, the ‗mythical separation‘ of official state directed T1 vis-à-vis private 
NGO-led T2 is maintained because it is useful for ASEAN governments to sponsor 
so-called independent ‗thinking outfits‘ to act as non-state interlocutors. It is a source 
of legitimation in the sense of consulting independent expertise outside the state, and 
a means to manage either sensitive or highly technical policy concerns between states. 
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Over a period of two decades a field of practice was created, and continues to be 
sustained, by the ASEAN-ISIS and many other T2 initiatives in the interpretive 
community. This is not to say that regional identity acquisition is learned 
automatically through processes of T2 communication and social engagement.  
Identity creation is a much more variable process. It is fragile, prone to set-backs, and 
at this point in time, is mostly limited to regional policy elites in the business and 
political worlds rather than wider society. These regional spaces are weakly 
institutionalised and ‗soft‘ in the sense that they are based often on dialogues and 
informal processes of diplomacy rather than formal multilateral organisation. Yet, 
these informal processes remain necessary if not a sufficient condition for the 
development of formal inter-governmental structures such as the ARF. Where 
institutions are weak or under-developed, discourse is strong. This is reflected in 
continuing proliferation of T2 and T3 activity witnessed in the region and which is 
bank-rolled by governments, business and philanthropy alike. While ASEAN-ISIS 
may now be of less policy significance in the more crowded and competitive realm of 
informal diplomacy, its experience shows how ‗interpretive communities‘ composed 
of like-minded think tanks, independent experts and university scholars can be central 
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